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Successfully navigating unfamiliar environments requires the ability to 
accurately update and apply a valid mental model of the environment to influence the 
next best move, and switch to other strategies if necessary. Recent research by 
Kikumoto & Mayr (2019) has shown that in competitive situations, humans employ 
model-based choice strategy following immediate positive feedback, but revert to 
random, stochastic choices following negative feedback. In this study, we attempt to 
recreate the results these authors found, but in a noncompetitive context. In one 
experiment measuring human subjects’ likelihood to switch tasks based on positive or 
negative feedback, we find similar results; participants will make mental models of an 
unfamiliar situation and repeat an action when rewarded with positive outcomes, but 
revert to a stochastic choice strategy when faced with negative outcomes, suggesting 
that this phenomenon is a general cognitive strategy in navigating unfamiliar 
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Imagine a player competing in a game of soccer. Winning the soccer match 
requires the player to keep track of their opponent’s actions, such as where they are on 
the field, where they are likely to kick the ball, and where they are likely to run to next. 
In addition, the player must keep track of their own actions as well; where should the 
player kick the ball? Where should the player run to? When people compete, there are 
two strategies employed: One can try to attempt to predict their opponent’s behavior, 
and one can attempt to make themselves unpredictable (Mayr & Bell, 2008). 
Competition itself is a dance between exploitation and avoiding being exploited.  
People’s actions are influenced by recent actions and events in uncertain 
environments, suggesting a heavy reliance on learning and memory processes. One such 
basic, memory-based process is the perseveration effect as demonstrated in the 
voluntary task-switching paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 2004). When subjects were 
asked to randomly pick between two different tasks on repeated individual trials, these 
authors showed that rather than being able to make perfectly 50/50 random choices, 
people tend to repeat their previous choice with a probability of roughly 70%. Another 
learning and memory process frequently used is the win-stay/lose-shift tendency, or 
what is called a “memory-free choice,” where people are likely to repeat a previous 
action when rewarded with positive feedback but switch to a different choice when 
receiving negative feedback (Forder & Dyson, 2016).   
When competing, a soccer player might also try to imagine what their opponent 
is going to do next and use their beliefs about their opponent’s strategies to influence 





environment to influence their next executed action is considered a model-based 
decision (Lee, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2014), often regarded as the most sophisticated 
use of our internal representations to guide upcoming actions. 
Yet, using model-based or memory-based choices can introduce regular patterns 
into players’ behavior that opponents in competitive situations may exploit. Likewise, 
given humans’ working memory limitations, it is difficult to consistently update and 
apply a valid model of an opponent. It is a natural conclusion, therefore, that when 
memory-based or model-based influences do not result in successful choices, people 
should be able to “turn off” these strategies and rely on a randomly selected choice 
process to determine their next action. At the very least, such random choices would be 
unpredictable to the opponent. 
Previous work by Kikumoto and Mayr (2019) has demonstrated that people use 
model-based choices when rewarded with positive outcomes, but switch to a stochastic, 
unpredictable strategy after negative outcomes.  The authors studied human subjects 
with a variant of the matching-pennies game, giving the participants one of two roles: 
They could either attempt to match their opponent’s next move (the “fox” role), or 
attempt to choose the opposite of the opponent’s next move (the “rabbit” role).  The 
critical experimental manipulation consisted of varying the rate in which the opponents 
switched their own choices from trial to trial, providing a very clear empirical criterion 
for when people are using a model-based strategy and when they are behaving 
unpredictably (Figure 1).  It was expected that participants receiving positive feedback 
should be specifically contingent with matching the switch rate of the opponent when 





following participant losses (i.e., the player should switch often when the opponent 
switches rarely and vice versa). In contrast, when participants behaved unpredictably, it 
was expected that they should switch choices over or around 50% of the time, and be 
unaffected by the switch rate of the opponent.   
 
Figure 1.  
Figure 1b from Kikumoto & Mayr’s (2019) hypothesis of model-based choice after 
wins and memory-free choice after losses predicted that player’s strategies would show 
a positive linear interaction between opponent switch rate and player switch rate after 
wins, and a negative linear interaction between opponent switch rate and player switch 
rate after losses. Additionally, they predicted a 50% player switch rate unrelated to the 
opponent’s switch rate after memory-free choices. The perseveration bias was predicted 
to lead to an overall debasement of switch rate, and a win/stay-lose/shift increase for 
post-loss trials, and a decrease post-win trials (Kikumoto & Mayr, 2019). 
Figure 1 also shows how the other memory-based phenomena, namely the 
perseveration and win-stay/lose-shift bias, were predicted to manifest in participants’ 
switch rates.  Results indeed showed that participants behaved in a model-based manner 





following negative feedback (Figure 2). In addition, perseveration and win-stay/lose-
shift biases were detected in the results. 
 
Figure 2.  
Kikumoto & Mayr (2019) showed average switch rates for post-win and post-loss trials as a 
function of the computerized opponents’ switch rates. The analysis included a regression of the 
player switch rate on the opponent switch rate. These results tended to follow the predicted 
model, with a positive linear interaction between player switch rate and opponent switch rate 
post-win, and a negative linear reaction between player switch rate and opponent switch rate 
post-loss.   
While this previous work provides strong evidence that in competitive situations 
there is a clear distinction between model-based and unpredictable, random decisions, it 
is not clear to what degree competition itself is a necessary condition for this pattern to 
emerge. It is an important question whether the feedback-based toggling between 
model-based and random behavior is constrained to competitive situations, or instead is 
a much more general feature of choice behavior in uncertain environments.  One might 





may be useful for failure to trigger a restart so that the organism may explore the full 
range of possible moves. 
There are also empirical reasons for suspecting that this observed phenomenon 
is not limited to competitive situations alone. Hermoso-Mendizabal et. al (2020) studied 
rats performing a two-choice auditory discrimination task, where the probability of 
stimulus repetition was modulated in blocks of trials, much like the switch rate of 
opponents in Kikumoto and Mayr (2019). The rats learned expectations about upcoming 
stimuli, as the task was designed to mimic regular timed events in an ecological 
environment, based on changes in the stimulus sequence. Similar to the results found in 
human participants, the rats also created mental models of their unfamiliar situation, and 
repeated or alternated their responses based on previous positive outcomes. The rats 
also reverted to random behavior after negative outcomes. Given the lack of 
competition in the task, the fact that rats showed this behavior pattern suggests that this 
choice strategy is general and not limited to competitive situations. 
Therefore, in the current study, we attempt to recreate the results of Kikumoto & 
Mayr (2019) in human participants in an exclusively non-competitive context. Upon 
finding a pattern of model-based choice following positive feedback, but stochasticity 
following negative feedback, we can rationally conclude that this mixed model-







Participants (N = 53) were University of Oregon students paid $10.00 per hour 
with an opportunity to earn an additional $0.02 per trial. The University of Oregon’s 
Human Subjects Review Board approved the study protocol. In accordance to the 
experiments used by Kikumoto and Mayr (2019), methods of data collection were 
modeled after the voluntary task-switching paradigm, with an identical task with 
different instructions modified to omit competitive context. Words like “win,” “lose,” or 
“game” were excluded. Instructions for the task asked participants to try to figure out 
the computer’s “rule” that decided on whether or not they earned $0.02 per trial based 
on their responses within individual trials, and based on a probabilistic rule that, 
unbeknownst to the participant, mimicked the “opponent” component of the Fox and 
Rabbit styled matching penny task.  
In every trial, the participant was faced with a white rectangular frame that 
appeared in the center of the screen. A red dot would randomly appear at either the top 
or bottom of the frame and would start shrinking once present. The participant would 
have to make their decision before the dot disappeared. The options were to keep the 
position of the dot or move it, using the spatially corresponding key on the number pad. 
Task instructions mentioned that the computer was deciding on whether or not the 
participant earned an extra $0.02 per trial, and it was up to the participant to guess this 
probabilistic rule. The participants completed 10 blocks of 80 individual trials. In the 
non-competitive task, the participant was simply trying to figure out how to earn more 





The degree to which participants used a model of their opponent was measured 
by exposing players to differing frequency shift rules, (i.e., the computerized opponents 
in Kikumoto & Mayr’s task) with varying average switch rates of 20%, 35%, 50%, 
65%, and 80%. Exactly like Kikumoto and Mayr (2019), as the participants kept or 
moved the position of the dot appearing in the frame on every trial, they were given 
instant feedback on whether or not they did or did not earn money (Figure 3). 
Measuring the participant’s switch-rate variations give a clear behavioral diagnostic of 
both model-based and memory-free behavior.  
 
Figure 3.  
Data collection task and trial events: Participants were given instant feedback on wins or losses 
after choosing to move or keep the position of a circle that randomly appeared at the top or 
bottom of a rectangular frame. Instead of framing the task as a competition between the 
participant and a computerized opponent, the participant was tasked with guessing the “rule” the 








As in Mayr and Kimumoto (2019), participants’ rate of switching their own 
choices from one trial to the next was the main dependent variable.   
Before testing the main prediction with a repeated measures ANOVA, we 
selectively inverted the labels for the computer modulated switch rate in the post-loss 
trials (e.g, 20% becomes 80%). Failure to do so would simply compare the slopes of the 
post-win and post-loss switch rate functions. This would not differentiate between a 
pattern of post-loss and post-win functions with the same slope but opposite signs, and 
the predicted pattern of more shallow slopes following losses. 
A significant main effect of previous trial outcome on player switch rate was 
found such that when players won in the previous trial (M = 0.422, SD = 0.494), they 
were likely to repeat their previous choice. However, when players lost on previous 
trials, they were likely to revert to stochastic, random behavior (M = 0.614, SD = 
0.487), F(1, 52) = 130.98, p<0.001 (Tables 1 & 2). Figure 4 shows the switch rate as a 
function of the opponent’s switch rate and win-versus-loss feedback. As apparent from 
the figure, the switch rate increases linearly as a function of opponent’s switch rate 
following win feedback, indicating model-based choice.  If people were behaving in the 
same model-based manner following losses, they would demonstrate a similarly steep 
switch rate function, just in the negative direction.  Instead, we see a more shallow 
function here, indicating that people chose in a largely random manner.  Overall, this 
pattern closely replicates the pattern of results that Kikumoto and Mayr have obtained 
















Loss 0.614 0.487 
Win  0.422 0.494 
Table 1. Effect of Previous Trial Win or Loss on Participant Switch Rate 




















WIN/LOSS 1 52 6.049 2.402 130.976 0 * 0.526 
MODEL  1 52 4.077 1.741 121.773 0 * 0.426 
WIN/LOSS:MODEL 1 52 1.326 1.317 52.3346 0 * 0.195 
 
Table 2. Linear Main Effect on Participant Switch Rate Categorized by Computer 
Switch Rate 
Descriptive statistics of computer switch rate (categorized by 20%, 35%, 50%, 65%, 






Figure 5.  
Average empirical switch rates for post-win and post-loss trains as a function of computerized 
“opponents’” switch rates. As a test of these interactions, we show the corresponding means 
(SD); green = post-win, red = post-loss. At computer switch rates 20%, 35%, 50%, 65%, and 
80%, participant switch rates were 0.388 (SD = 0.487), 0.489 (SD = 0.5), 0.520 (SD = 0.5), 
0.562 (SD = 0.496), and 0.626 (SD = 0.484), respectively. 
 
It is noteworthy however that there are also differences to the past results. 
Specifically, whereas in Kikumoto and Mayr, switch rates following losses hovered 
around 50%, they were substantially higher in the current experiment.  On average, the 
contrast between win trials and loss trials was nearly 20% (see Table 1), indicating that 
in this experiment the win-stay/loss-shift bias was particularly strong. It is possible that 
the absence of opponents strengthens this reward-based strategy, perhaps because 
players here need to worry less that such strategy would be exploited by a clever 
opponent. Overall, however these results clearly demonstrate the generality of the 






The question we tried to answer in this research is to what degree a previous 
observed strategy of feedback-contingent toggling between model-based and random 
choices (Kikumoto & Mayr, 2019) is confined to competitive situations.  Our results 
provide a very clear answer: The mixed-strategy pattern can be observed even when we 
carefully avoid any reference to a competitive context.  Therefore, we can conclude that 
the mixed strategy is a general characteristic of choice behavior in uncertain situations.   
This work is generally consistent with previous research indicating that people 
use a mixture of different types of choice strategies in an adaptive manner (Lee, 
Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2014). Aside from the model-based and the random choice 
strategy, our data also show a very strong influence of the memory-free, win-stay/lose-
shift bias (Forder & Dyson, 2016, & Hermoso-Mendizabal et. al, 2020). It is noteworthy 
that this tendency was considerably stronger in the current experiments than in the 
results by Kikumoto and Mayr (2019) despite the otherwise identical paradigm. 
Possibly this by itself reflects an adaptive response: In the absence of an obvious 
opponent who can exploit one’s choice regularities this strategy of repeating what was 
just successful, may appear less risky to participants.   
Our results indicate that the mixed model-based/random strategy is a general 
phenomenon, which opens the floor to some interesting further research considerations. 
A general tendency for random behavior after losses may have an intersection with 
learned helplessness in depressed adults. The literature describes learned helplessness as 
the tendency to stop behaving in a systematic manner when a situation appears 





tendency to abandon a mental model after losses is at the heart of this phenomenon.  
Therefore, it is particularly interesting that this occurs not just in competitive situations, 
but apparently in a much more general manner.  In future work it would be important to 
test to what degree depressed individuals exhibit an increased tendency towards random 
behavior following negative feedback  
This is just one example of how these findings may be applied to further 
research. Whether on the soccer field or when navigating day-to-day situations, human 
cognition is remarkable in the ways that we can apply a finite number of functions to 
















Loss 0.614 0.487 
Win  0.422 0.494 
Table 1. Effect of Previous Trial Win or Loss on Participant Switch Rate 
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Figure 1.  
Figure 1b from Kikumoto & Mayr’s (2019) hypothesis of model-based choice after 
wins and memory-free choice after losses predicted that player’s strategies would show 
a positive linear interaction between opponent switch rate and player switch rate after 
wins, and a negative linear interaction between opponent switch rate and player switch 
rate after losses. Additionally, they predicted a 50% player switch rate unrelated to the 
opponent’s switch rate after memory-free choices. The perseveration bias was predicted 
to lead to an overall debasement of switch rate, and a win/stay-lose/shift increase for 










Figure 2.  
Kikumoto & Mayr (2019) showed average switch rates for post-win and post-loss trials 
as a function of the computerized opponents’ switch rates. The analysis included a 
regression of the player switch rate on the opponent switch rate. These results tended to 
follow the predicted model, with a positive linear interaction between player switch rate 
and opponent switch rate post-win, and a negative linear reaction between player switch 










Figure 3.  
Data collection task and trial events: Participants were given instant feedback on wins 
or losses after choosing to move or keep the position of a circle that randomly appeared 
at the top or bottom of a rectangular frame. Instead of framing the task as a competition 
between the participant and a computerized opponent, the participant was tasked with 
guessing the “rule” the computer was using to decided whether or not to reward them 







Figure 5.  
Average empirical switch rates for post-win and post-loss trains as a function of 
computerized “opponents’” switch rates. As a test of these interactions, we show the 
corresponding means (SD); green = post-win, red = post-loss. At computer switch rates 
20%, 35%, 50%, 65%, and 80%, participant switch rates were 0.388 (SD = 0.487), 
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